Measuring management insulation from shareholder pressure by Ferreira, Daniel et al.
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2170392 
 
Measuring Management Insulation from Shareholder 
Pressure 
 
Daniel Ferreira, David Kershaw, Tom Kirchmaier, and Edmund Schuster 
 
February 5, 2016 
 
 
Abstract 
We propose a management insulation measure based on charter, bylaw, and corporate law 
provisions that make it difficult for shareholders to oust a firm’s management. Unlike the 
existing alternatives, our measure considers the interactions between different provisions. 
We illustrate the usefulness of our measure with an application to the banking industry. 
We find that banks in which managers were more insulated from shareholders in 2003 
were significantly less likely to be bailed out in 2008/09. These banks were also less likely 
to be targeted by activist shareholders, as proxied by 13D SEC filings. By contrast, 
popular alternative measures of insulation -- such as staggered boards and the 
Entrenchment Index -- fail to predict both bailouts and shareholder activism. 
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1  Introduction 
 
Scholars of corporate law and finance have long argued the case for and against 
governance arrangements that hinder shareholders’ ability to remove directors or 
to interfere with board decisions. Those against focus on the lack of direct 
accountability for managers, which provides them with more room to use corporate 
power to further their own interests. This results in increased agency costs and 
destroys value (Bebchuk, Coates, and Subramanian (2002); Bebchuk and Cohen 
(2005); Cohen and Wang (2013)). Those in favor of management insulation argue 
that, although reduced accountability may result in increased agency costs, the 
benefits of insulation outweigh those costs. The benefits come from the ability of 
managers to make long-term value decisions and to resist managing to the short-
term pressures generated by shareholders and the market (Lipton and Rosenblum, 
(1991); Bainbridge (2006); Bratton and Wachter (2010); Cremers, Litov, and Sepe 
(2014); Cremers and Sepe (2016)).  
 This debate about the merits or demerits of insulation can only be settled 
empirically. To do so requires an accurate and reliable measure of management 
insulation. To date the literature has approached the question of how to measure 
legal insulation in two different ways. The first is to take the existence of a 
classified board (i.e., a staggered board) as a proxy for insulation (e.g., Bebchuk, 
Coates, and Subramanian (2002); Bebchuk and Cohen (2005); Falaye (2007); 
Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2007), Bates, Becher, and Lemmon (2008); Cohen and 
Wang (2013); Cremers, Litov, and Sepe (2014); Karakas and Mohseni (2016)). The 
second is to create a legal index by aggregating a set of corporate legal rules that 
are thought to contribute either to management insulation or to shareholder 
empowerment (e.g., Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003); Bebchuk, Cohen and 
Ferrell (2009)). Cremers and Ferrell (2014) provide a recent application of the two 
approaches. 
The main contribution of this article is to develop and apply an improved 
measure of management insulation from shareholder pressure, and to test whether 
this measure is more informative than existing management insulation metrics. 
 The most popular corporate governance indices are the G-index (Gompers, 
Ishii, and Metrick (2003)) and its parsimonious variation, the E-Index (Bebchuk, 
Cohen, and Ferrell (2009)).1 These indices are constructed by awarding scores 
based on the existence or absence of a set of legal rules and governance provisions. 
                                      
1 For a recent re-examination of these indices and their empirical performance, see Karpoff, 
Schonlau, and Wehrly (2015). 
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This way of indexing, however, ignores the fact that certain governance 
arrangements can be rendered functionally irrelevant by the presence or absence 
of other rules. As the inclusion of an irrelevant governance provision has an impact 
on the final score, it adds noise to the final index values. The inclusion of irrelevant 
governance provisions also means that similar index scores do not necessarily 
represent similar outcomes.  
 Our measure, which we call the Management Insulation Index (MI-index), 
takes a different route. Instead of linear indexing, the MI-index is a contingent 
index: It considers the interaction between different legal rules, also taking into 
account the differences in state corporate laws across the US. The index is 
interpretable and economically meaningful. It provides an answer to the following 
question: How long would it take for a majority group of shareholders to gain 
control of the board? In answering this question, the MI-index codifies six 
combinations of governance arrangements that affect the time it takes for gaining 
control of the board. 
 There are two main advantages of the MI-index. First, the MI-index has a 
more natural interpretation than that of most alternative indices. Second, because 
of our contingent approach to the construction of the index, we expect the MI-
index to be less affected by measurement errors. This is particularly important in 
small-sample settings. This conjecture is supported by our evidence. 
To test and validate our approach, we apply our index to analyze the link 
between bank governance and performance in the last financial crisis. The existing 
evidence linking governance to bank performance during the crisis has uncovered 
some surprising results. Beltratti and Stulz (2012) find that banks with 
shareholder-friendly boards performed particularly poorly during the crisis. 
Similarly, a positive relation between board independence (as a proxy for strong 
governance) and bank bailouts (as a proxy for bad performance) is found in Adams 
(2012) and Minton, Taillard, and Williamson (2014). Similar evidence can also be 
found in Erkens, Hung, and Matos (2012) and Chesney, Stromberg, and Wagner 
(2012).   
The relation between governance and bank failures during the crisis is thus 
a natural testing ground for management insulation indices. To construct our 
index, for each year in the 2003-2007 period we hand-collected data on governance 
arrangements of 276 bank holding companies (from now on we simply refer to them 
as banks) from the applicable corporation laws and the banks’ charters and bylaws. 
We use this data to construct the MI-index and the E-index (Bebchuk, Cohen and 
Ferrell (2009)) for each bank throughout the 2003-2006 period. As expected, the 
MI-index and the E-index are positively correlated, but the correlation is far from 
perfect (0.36). Our goal is to compare the predictive abilities of the MI-index and 
the E-index. 
Using the MI-index, we find that banks with less insulated managers were 
more likely to receive capital injections under the Capital Purchase Program 
(CPP), the main bank-recapitalization program under the US Troubled Assets 
Relief Program (TARP). In particular, we find that the MI-index in 2003 is a 
robust predictor of bank bailouts in 2008-09. This result is economically and 
statistically strong, despite the relatively small size of our sample. Our most 
conservative estimate suggests that banks with the highest management insulation 
scores were 18 percentage points less likely to be bailed out than banks with the 
lowest insulation scores. 
 By contrast, we find that the E-index has an economically and statistically 
weak relation with bank bailouts. The effect of the E-index is further reduced once 
the MI-index is introduced in the predictive regressions. The MI-index thus appears 
to contain information that is not captured by E-index. 
 Our empirical strategy relies on the fact that governance arrangements in 
charters, bylaws and state corporate laws are very persistent, and thus the 
governance provisions in place in 2003 still have significant forecasting power for 
bank outcomes in 2008-09. To account for the possibility of omitted persistent 
factors, we saturate the empirical model with a number of bank characteristics. In 
particular, we use a flexible specification for bank size and include state dummies, 
as size and state effects are likely to be strong predictors of bailouts. We find that, 
in models with more covariates, the marginal effects of MI-index on bailouts tend 
to be stronger. Such a pattern suggests that omitted variables are unlikely to 
explain our findings. By contrast, the relation between the E-index and bailouts 
remains weak across specifications. 
To validate the interpretation of the MI-index and the E-index as measures 
of management insulation from shareholder pressure, we investigate whether these 
measures are related to variables associated with shareholder activism. We expect 
management insulation provisions to act as a deterrent to shareholder activism. 
To measure shareholder activism, we use the fact that Section 13d and Regulation 
13D of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 require that an investor who crosses a 
5% beneficial ownership threshold in relation to a publicly traded company must 
file a Schedule 13D, unless that investor does not intend to change or influence the 
control of the corporation. Accordingly, Schedule 13D filings represent a plausible 
proxy for the extent to which corporations are subject to actual or probable 
shareholder activism. Some papers that use Schedule 13D filings as a proxy for 
activism include Brav, Jiang, Partnoy, and Thomas (2008), Edmans, Fang and 
Zur (2013), and Collin-Dufresne and Fos (2015), among others.  
If less insulated banks are subject to more shareholder pressure, we would 
expect to see more 13D filings in relation to banks with low MI-index scores and 
fewer such filings in relation to banks with higher MI-index scores. Our evidence 
indeed shows that banks with low MI-index scores in 2003 were significantly more 
likely to have at least one 13D filing between 2003 and 2007. By contrast, there is 
no robust correlation between the E-index and 13D filings. 
 The application of our new measure to the banking industry leads to two 
conclusions. First, the MI-index has a better empirical performance than its best 
alternative – the E-Index – in the sense of generating estimates of marginal effects 
that are more statistically precise and economically significant. Second, unlike the 
E-index, the MI-index appears to be related to measures of shareholder activism. 
We then turn to an investigation of the mechanism linking governance and 
bailouts. We find that banks with insulated managers were less likely to be bailed 
out partly because these banks rejected bailout funds. Forgoing cheap funds may 
be a symptom of bad governance that is picked up by our index. But we also find 
that those banks appeared to be in a stronger financial position during the crisis. 
This stronger position could be explained by their focus on more traditional 
banking activities, as evidenced by their more conservative asset and income 
composition profile. Management insulation may thus reduce bank risk taking and 
improve banks’ resilience in crises. Such a hypothesis is compatible with some of 
the evidence documented by the existing literature (e.g., Beltratti and Stulz (2012) 
and Minton, Taillard, and Williamson (2014)).  
Our conclusions depend crucially on the measure of management insulation. 
Our improved measure appears to contain information that is not present in some 
of the alternatives, such as the E-index and the existence of a classified (or 
staggered) board. But there is a trade-off. Although the MI-index is, at least in 
theory, superior to the E-index, its construction is more time consuming. Our 
results suggest that the extra effort that goes into constructing the MI-index may 
actually pay off.  
 
2  Measuring Management Insulation 
 
2.1  Existing measures of management insulation 
 
A very simple but compelling measure of management insulation is the presence of 
a classified (or staggered) board. In a classified board, directors (typically) serve 
three-year terms and only a third of board members stand for re-election at each 
annual general meeting. A body of empirical work finds that firms with classified 
boards perform worse than firms without classified boards. Bebchuk and Cohen 
(2005) and Falaye (2007) find that classified boards are associated with lower firm 
value as measured by Tobin’s Q.  Cremers and Ferrell (2014) find that between 
1985 and 2006 corporations with classified boards had an 8.2% lower valuation (as 
measured by Tobin’s Q) than firms without classified boards. By contrast, 
Cremers, Litov, and Sepe (2014) criticize the existing literature for making strong 
causal claims based on cross-sectional evidence. When considering over-time 
changes in board classification status, these authors find that the adoption of 
classified boards has mostly a positive effect on firm value. Even with the help of 
natural experiments (Cohen and Wang (2013); Karakas and Mohseni (2016)), the 
value implications of classified boards are still controversial (Amihud and Stoyanov 
(2015)).2 
 The key assumption underpinning the use of a classified board as a proxy 
for insulation is that, the longer the minimum time period within which 
shareholders can obtain control of the board, the more insulated managers feel. 
Management insulation is thus understood to be a function of the time (and thus, 
likely, cost) it would take for shareholders to obtain control of the board. Without 
a classified board, all directors have a maximum of a one-year term and, in some 
cases, the rules governing the corporation enable the replacement of the board 
during the one-year term. If a corporation has a classified board, then each director 
has a three-year term, and within such term it is often the case that the directors 
can only be removed for cause.  As the “for cause” threshold is typically a very 
high legal threshold,3 this means that a shareholder committed to changing the 
board will have to wait for two consecutive general meetings to do so (with a third 
of the board being replaced at each of those general meetings).    
In our view, the assumption that insulation is primarily a function of the 
time-control frame is a sound one.  The main weakness of the classified board 
variable is that it does not control for the myriad of other corporate legal rules 
that may impact on the board’s responsiveness to shareholder interests. Broader 
corporate governance indices have then been developed to provide a more robust 
measure of insulation. 
The pre-eminent example of such an index is the G-Index, developed by 
Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003), which codes for 24 governance provisions, 
including classified boards, golden parachutes, director indemnification provisions, 
poison pills, and fair price charter provisions, among others. Gompers, Ishii, and 
                                      
2 Larcker, Ormazabal, and Taylor (2011) also provide evidence that questions the value implications 
of classified boards. 
3 Ralph Campbell v Loews Incorporated 134 A.2d 565 (Del.1957). 
Metrick (2003) find that a trading strategy associated with buying firms with 
strong G-Index rights and selling companies with low G-Index rights would have 
generated an 8.5% abnormal return. More recently, Cremers and Ferrell (2014) 
find a negative association between the G-Index and Tobin’s Q. 
Despite its widespread use, some commentators have expressed skepticism 
about the legal quality of this index. In particular, they have noted concerns about 
the inclusion of provisions that either have no impact on management insulation 
or benefit from widespread shareholder support (Klausner, 2013). Bebchuk, Cohen, 
and Ferrell (2009) observe that “some provisions might have little relevance and 
some provisions might be positively correlated with firm value” (p.784). A further 
problem with an index of this nature is that this linear way of indexing ignores the 
fact that certain governance arrangements can be rendered functionally irrelevant 
by the presence or absence of other rules. If Rule X is only relevant in the absence 
of Rule Y, then an index that codes only for Rule X – or, indeed, one that codes 
for both, but assigns scores for Rule X irrespective of whether Rule Y is also present 
– may be a noisy measure of insulation. An additional complication is the fact that 
similar index scores do not necessarily represent similar governance outcomes.  
Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009) attempt to address some of the 
weaknesses associated with the G-Index’s large bucket of important and less 
important legal rights by reducing the number of provisions from 24 to 6. They 
identify these provisions as those that have received “substantial opposition” from 
institutional shareholders in shareholder meetings.  Their E-index is based on six 
governance provisions, indicating the presence or absence of a classified board, 
supermajority charter amendment provisions, supermajority bylaw amendment 
provisions, super majority merger provisions, poison pills, and golden parachutes. 
They also show that the reduction in the number of coded provisions appears to 
enhance the informativeness of the index. These six provisions appear “to be largely 
driving the correlation that [the G-Index has] with Tobin’s Q” (Bebchuk, Cohen, 
and Ferrell (2009), p. 785). Nevertheless, as a linear index, the E-Index also suffers 
from the same theoretical weakness identified above in relation to the G-Index: 
The E-Index provisions do not take account of their possible interactions with 
other rules that may render them functionally irrelevant. 
 
2.2  Background to the Management Insulation Index 
 
There are two distinctive aspects of corporate law in the United States that are of 
importance for this paper. First, corporate law in the United States is state-based. 
Each state is a separate corporate law jurisdiction. As is well known, Delaware is 
viewed as the market leader among US states.4 Accordingly, when scholars consider 
“US corporate law” they typically focus on the Delaware corporate code and 
Delaware case law. While there is significant convergence amongst states' corporate 
law rules - and has been since the early late 19th and early 20th century, when many 
states followed the lead of the then market leader New Jersey - there are many 
notable differences of approach between states in relation to basic corporate rules, 
such as shareholder rights to call shareholder meetings and to remove directors. 
A presumption of state-wide convergence to the Delaware approach yields 
an inaccurate assessment of managers' insulation from shareholders. For example, 
the consequences of having a classified board in Delaware are very different from 
the consequences in Florida, Georgia, or California. This factor will vary in 
importance depending on the prevalence of Delaware corporations in the subject 
firm sample. Delaware has clearly established its position as the main provider of 
corporate law, at least for listed companies. However, its dominance may be less 
pronounced amongst certain industry sectors. For example, while 68% of the non-
bank constituents of the Russell 3000 index are incorporated in Delaware as of 
February 2013, only 21% of our sample banks are governed by Delaware corporate 
law (compared to 22% of the banks in the Russell 3000 index).5   
The second distinctive aspect of corporate law in the United States is that 
many of the core corporate law rules, including shareholder rights to remove 
directors and call shareholder meetings, are optional. This contrasts with other 
common and civil law jurisdictions such as the UK and Germany, where such 
rights are mandatory. It follows that in order to determine how exposed managers 
are to activist shareholder threats and pressure, we cannot simply consider the 
mandatory and default corporate law rules of the state of the bank's incorporation, 
but need to look at those rules in combination with an analysis of the bank's 
constitutional documents, its charter and bylaws. 
The MI-index aims to capture the cross-firm variation in legal rights that 
shareholders can use to oust management or, perhaps more importantly, credibly 
threaten to do so. It is not our aim to create a general corporate governance or 
shareholder rights index. We exclusively focus on answering the question of how 
core corporate law rules make it more or less time-consuming (and hence costly) 
to challenge incumbent management. A determined and coordinated shareholder 
body can, in all US jurisdictions, ultimately decide on the composition of the board. 
The differences we identify mainly focus on the speed and level of coordination 
                                      
4 Amongst all Fortune 500 companies, 59% are incorporated in Delaware, which has a 0.3% share 
of the US population; see Bebchuk and Hamdani (2002). 
5 Percentages calculated based on data contained in the CapitalIQ database. 
necessary to achieve a change in management. The underlying assumption is that 
such a time-control variable plays an important de facto role in insulating 
managers, as the financial return of shareholder intervention required by activist 
investors will crucially depend on the time horizon of such a payoff. 
 
2.3  The determination of MI-index values 
 
Our index takes values from one to six. We identify four main ways in which 
shareholders can gain control over the corporation's board. 
First, where all directors are elected annually, shareholders can simply 
exercise their voting rights to elect different directors. 
Second, shareholders sometimes have the right to simply remove directors 
“without cause.” While this is more common in corporations with unclassified 
boards, it is not uncommon in corporations with classified boards. 
Third, where the board is classified and the removal right is a “with cause” 
removal right, shareholders can either wait for two years (two consecutive annual 
shareholder meetings) in order to gain board control, or they can try to “declassify” 
the board (i.e., changing the bank's governance arrangements to switch to annual 
election of all directors). The former option is time-consuming and costly. The 
availability of the latter option crucially depends on the firm's constitutional 
arrangements set forth in its charter and by-laws, as well as the rules determining 
how the constitution can be amended. 
A corporation's charter can only be amended with both board and 
shareholder approval. Accordingly, where board classification is set forth in the 
charter, de-classification is only possible with board approval. In the absence of a 
contrary provision in the firm's charter, shareholders can typically amend a 
corporation’s bylaws by majority vote. If the board's classification is set forth in 
the bylaws then it can be declassified by shareholders alone. In some corporations, 
however, the charter or state corporate law may impose additional restrictions on 
a bylaw amendment including board approval or a supermajority shareholder vote. 
This declassification strategy is only effective where declassification also results in 
the application of a “without cause” removal right, which can be exercised following 
the declassification, since the directors' tenure will be unaffected by the 
declassification. 
Fourth, shareholders can elect additional directors to the board and thereby 
outnumber the incumbent directors (board packing). The availability of this option 
again depends on the provisions in the charter and bylaws of each corporation and 
the number of appointed directors: Shareholders must first have the right to 
increase the size of the current board, which differs from firm to firm. Moreover, if 
the charter provides for a maximum board size (as it often does), this maximum 
number must be large enough for the newly appointed directors to be able to 
outnumber the existing board members. In firms with classified boards, this means 
that the maximum board size has to be greater by at least a third than the current 
board size. This allows shareholders to increase board size to the maximum, fill 
the vacancies and, together with the third of directors elected annually, to gain 
control of the board. 
Where the constellation of shareholder rights enables shareholders in theory 
to take control of the board, the next question for an insulation index is to 
determine how quickly the shareholders’ rights can be exercised. This is a function 
of whether or not shareholders can call an interim meeting in between annual 
shareholder meetings6 or whether they can act by written consent (a consent 
solicitation)7 outside of an annual general meeting. In most jurisdictions, whether 
or not this is possible depends on whether or not the corporation’s constitutional 
documents grant shareholders the power to call, or requisition directors to call, a 
meeting. In some jurisdictions, for example, California, shareholders have a 
mandatory right to call a meeting. 
In accordance with the time-control theory which underpins the index, the 
MI-index provides for three governance groupings: First, where shareholders can, 
in theory, gain control over the firm’s board almost immediately (MI-index scores 
of 1 and 2); second, where they can gain control within – at most –  a one year 
(one meeting) time frame (MI-index scores of 3 and 4); or where they will have to 
wait for approximately two years -- a two-year (two-meeting) time frame (MI-
index scores of 5 and 6). Note that the extent of management insulation in 
                                      
6 Where shareholders do not have to wait for an annual stockholder meeting to exercise their rights, 
we also have to adjust our calculations of the “increase board size” strategy. As directors’ terms are 
unaffected by the holding of a special meeting, we compare the actual board size with the maximum 
board size. To illustrate this point, take a corporation with a maximum board size of 21, and an 
actual board size of 12. While shareholders could gain control over the board in an annual meeting 
(where the terms of 4 directors expire, and shareholders thus can elect a total of 13 directors), this 
is not true in a special meeting (where only 9 available seats could be filled, leaving the current 
board in control). Where, as in the above example, control can only be obtained by increasing 
board size coupled with the replacement of the directors whose term expires, banks can only be 
classified as MI-index 3 or 4 regardless of the existence of a right to call a special meeting.  
7 In our indexing, we only treat rights to act by written consent (i.e. without a meeting) as 
equivalent to special meeting rights, where its exercise does not depend on the consent of holders 
of all, or a supermajority of, outstanding shares. 
categories 3 to 6 varies during the year as a function of the length of time to the 
next annual general meeting, with categories 1-4 featuring similar levels of 
insulation immediately prior to the annual general meeting.   
Note also that within each of these three groups we code for director 
nomination provisions. Such provisions require advance notice given to the 
company, typically 90 days prior to a general meeting, in order to be able to 
nominate a director. Such provisions mean that unless the company is notified 
prior to the nomination cut-off date, shareholders will have to wait for the next 
general meeting to nominate a director.  Their presence, therefore, adds an 
additional element of insulation by giving the board more time to plan their 
response to an activist shareholder and by reducing the period in each year during 
which the board is most “vulnerable.” 
For some corporations the determination of their MI-index values is 
straightforward. A company that: (i) does not have a classified board, (ii) has a 
without cause removal right, and (iii) has the right to call interim meeting is 
allocated an MI-index value of 1. Similarly, a corporation that has a classified 
board and both (ii) and (iii) also receives an MI-index value of 1. However, for 
some companies several paths may have to be explored to determine their MI-
index values. For example, consider a corporation that has a classified board with 
a with-cause removal right. Although the board could be declassified, it does not 
affect the removal right. But suppose further that the board can be packed 
immediately. Such a corporation also ends up with an MI-index value 1. 
The chart below (Figure 1) shows the different “paths” leading to each of 
our six outcomes. In the Appendix, we describe each index value in detail and the 
“paths” leading to these values. 
When the MI-index is applied to a panel of firms the question that arises is 
how to aggregate the MI-index data. An option is to assign a score of 1 to 6 to 
each of the MI-index categories. This is what we call the MI-index. However, there 
is no a priori reason to assume that all categories within the MI-index are equally 
important. In fact, we believe that MI-index values 5 and 6 represent a level of 
management insulation that is vastly stronger than all the other levels. Thus, we 
also create an indicator variable that takes the value of one if the management 
insulation index is equal to five or six, otherwise it is zero. We call this variable 
the Management Insulation Dummy (MID). This variable has a straightforward 
interpretation: it indicates those banks for which it would take two consecutive 
shareholder meetings for a majority coalition of shareholders to gain control of the 
board.  
 
3  Data 
 
Our initial sample consists of 476 US based commercial banks that were publicly 
listed in 2008 and for which data were available in the BoardEx database in May 
2009. We define banks as those companies that held a banking license at the end 
of 2008. Our sample includes all US investment banks that obtained a banking 
license as part of the 2008 bailout. Our unit of analysis is a bank holding company; 
fully-owned subsidiaries are not included. We then exclude all banks that were 
initially floated after 2003, which reduces our sample to 421 banks. 
We obtain data on participation of each bank in the Capital Purchase 
Program (CPP), as well as information on repayment of CPP funds from the 
official reports published by the U.S. Treasury and by the Office of the Special 
Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program (SIGTARP). 
In order to construct the MI-index, we tried to obtain the articles of 
incorporation and bylaws applicable between 2003 and 2007 for all remaining banks 
in our sample. We first excluded all banks that were not listed throughout the 
2003–2007 period. For the remaining banks, the documents were hand-collected 
using the SEC EDGAR database as well as state-based document repositories. 
Even though listed companies are in principle required to file with the SEC 
their articles of incorporation as part of their annual reports, we were not able to 
collect the relevant documents for some banks. There are two reasons for this. 
First, corporations are allowed to incorporate the articles of incorporation and 
bylaws by reference to prior filings. In many instances, the filings referred to were 
submitted to the SEC before 1994, and are thus unavailable electronically through 
the EDGAR database. This concerns those banks in our sample that did not change 
their articles/bylaws between 1994 and 2007. Second, corporations are not required 
to restate their articles of incorporation or bylaws after each amendment. 
Consequently, if they choose not to consolidate the amendments, and where the 
original articles/bylaws date from a time prior to 1994, a precise re-construction 
of the corporate governance documents was not always possible.  Where possible, 
we supplemented data available in the SEC EDGAR database with filings available 
electronically through the relevant state business registers. We were able to obtain 
at least partial information for 317 banks, and full sets of all constitutional 
documents for the 2003-2007 timeframe for 276 banks. We collect information on 
the specific governance provisions we identified when constructing the management 
insulation index (see the detailed description in Section 1). 
The majority of banks in our sample are not constituents of the S&P 1500 
Index, and E-Index values are therefore not readily available. We thus hand-
collected information on our sample banks and coded them following Bebchuk, 
Cohen, and Ferrell (2009).  
 We obtain data on all Schedule 13D filings with the SEC during the 2003-
2007 period from the WRDS SEC Analytics database. We obtain bank financial 
data from Worldscope. We use book assets as a proxy for bank size, and we 
measure leverage as assets over common equity. We collect detailed investor level 
ownership data from Bankscope and compensation data for the highest paid 
director from CapitalIQ. We also construct a variable that counts the number of 
bank acquisitions between 2003 and 2006. We only include those transactions in 
which the acquirer achieved full control by acquiring at least 50% of the target. 
For this we use the entire M&A database from Thomson One Banker, and match 
the acquirer’s name against the bank names in our initial database per year. We 
match the acquisitions of subsidiaries to the parent company. We construct a 
banking experience indicator variable that equals one if the director had a prior 
management or top-executive position in any bank, and an independence variable 
based on whether a bank director is declared independent. We adjust the 
independence variable for a number of dimensions such as prior employment and 
material client relationship.8 
 
4  Management Insulation Scores: Summary Statistics 
 
We assign a score of 1 to 6 to each bank-year from 2003 to 2007, according to the 
procedure described in Figure 1. Table I shows the number of observations in each 
group. Figure 2 shows the frequency of each group per year. We find that most 
banks are either in group 2 (about 28%) or in group 6 (about 32%). Groups 1 and 
4 are also significant (about 15% each), but groups 3 and 5 are both fairly 
uncommon. The distribution of management insulation scores is very stable over 
the years. The reason for this stability is the fact that the governance provisions 
that are used in the construction of the index are rarely modified. In some cases, 
these provisions have been in place for decades. This feature is useful for our 
empirical strategy. 
Table II shows the cross-sectional averages of the MI-index (Management 
Insulation Index) and the MID (Management Insulation Dummy) variables per 
year. It also shows the average of a Classified Board Dummy (CBD) variable. If 
we consider board classification (i.e., the existence of a staggered board) as a 
measure of managerial entrenchment, we note that, compared to our management 
                                      
8 For an extensive description of the adjustment process, see Ferreira, Kirchmaier, and Metzger 
(2010). 
insulation dummy, the classified board dummy substantially overestimates the 
extent to which managers are entrenched. While 77% of the boards in our sample 
are classified in 2003, in only 38% of the banks managers are substantially insulated 
from shareholder pressure, according to our measure. The MID variable thus paints 
a very different picture of management insulation in banks from the one suggested 
by the CBD variable. 
We expect the MID variable to contain different information than that in 
the CBD. Table III shows the percentage of banks that have classified boards, but 
do not have a management insulation index of 5 or 6. Just under 40% of all banks 
have classified boards and their managers are not fully insulated. In fact, it is 
possible for banks with classified boards to achieve very low scores of management 
insulation. For example, in 2007, 16% of the classified-board banks had a 
management insulation index of 1 and 19.5% of such banks had a management 
insulation index of 2 (results not tabulated). 
Table IV shows the number of observations in each of the seven groups that 
form the E-index, for two selected years, 2003 and 2006. For our baseline year of 
2003, we also show the proportion of observations with MID=1 for each E-index 
score. As expected, the larger E-index scores are associated with a higher 
probability if MID=1; this relation is monotonic. Table V shows pairwise 
correlations for all insulation variables, including the Entrenchment Dummy (ED), 
which is an indicator function of values of E-index greater or equal to 4. The MI-
index and the E-index are positively correlated, but the correlation is not very 
high. 
Table VI presents the summary statistics of the main variables used in our 
empirical analysis. The unit of observation is a bank-year, thus the maximum 
sample size is 1267. Some variables are however only available for some years. We 
see from Table VI that about 56% of the banks in the sample received funds from 
the Federal Government’ s Capital Repurchase Program (CPP funds) during the 
financial crisis. 
Table VII presents the averages of selected bank variables, conditional on 
the values of the Management Insulation Dummy in 2003. We see that insulated 
banks were 19 percentage points less likely to be bailed out (defined as 
participation in the CPP). This difference is statistically significant. The economic 
significance of this effect is substantial, as the unconditional probability of bailout 
in our sample is 56%. That is, a negative relation between management insulation 
and bailouts exists and is quite strong, even before we consider the impact of 
additional variables on bailouts. Management insulation in 2003 is (in part 
mechanically) correlated to board classification in 2006, although this correlation 
is far from perfect. Insulated banks are larger on average (but the median insulated 
bank is smaller than the median non-insulated bank). All the other characteristics 
are very similar across the two groups. 
Finally, Table VIII presents the averages of selected bank variables, 
conditional on the values of the Entrenchment Dummy in 2003. According to this 
measure, insulated banks were only 6 percentage points less likely to be bailed out. 
This difference is not statistically different from zero.  
 
5  Management Insulation and Bank Bailouts 
 
Our goal in this section is to estimate the probability that a bank is bailed out, 
which is measured by the bank’s participation in the Capital Purchase Program 
(CPP) in 2008-2009. To investigate the role of bank characteristics on the 
probability of bailouts, we estimate the following model: 
 
Pr(Y𝑖 = 1|x𝑖) = Φ(x𝑖
′β),                               (1) 
 
where Y𝑖 is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if bank 𝑖 has received 
CPP funds, x𝑖 is a vector of lagged bank characteristics (as of 2006 or earlier), β 
is a vector of parameters to be estimated, and Φ is a the standardized normal 
cumulative distribution function (i.e. a Probit model). We do not report the 
estimates for the vector β; instead, we always report estimated marginal effects 
evaluated at the means of the data, so that the reported estimates can be readily 
interpreted and compared. Our results are not sensitive to the Probit specification. 
Our main right-hand side variable of interest is the Management Insulation 
Dummy (MID). As we discuss above, the maximum level of insulation (MI-
index=5 or MI-index=6) is likely to offer substantially more protection to 
managers than all the other levels. As further indication of the salience of that 
insulation level, we note that 38% of the banks in our sample have MI-index=5 or 
MI-index=6 in 2003. We thus define the MID variable as an indicator variable 
that takes the value of one if MI-index=5 or MI-index=6 and zero otherwise. Using 
different partitions of the MI-index variable yields similar results. 
We use the Entrenchment Dummy (ED) as an alternative measure of 
management insulation. The Entrenchment Dummy is an indicator function of 
values of E-index greater or equal to 4. We use this indicator variable to facilitate 
the comparison with the MID; we obtain similar results using the E-index instead 
of the ED (these results are omitted for brevity). We have also used the Classified 
Board Dummy variable as a simpler alternative to both the MID and the ED. For 
brevity, we do not report the results using this variable in tables; we mention such 
results in the text where appropriate. 
Because of the small size of the sample, we choose a parsimonious set of 
covariates to be included in x𝑖. As larger banks are more likely to be bailed out 
(the “too big to fail” effect), controlling for size is important. We use (the natural 
logarithm of) the book value of assets as a proxy for size. In order to give more 
functional-form flexibility to the effect of size on bailouts, we run spline regressions 
in which the effect of size on bailouts is allowed to differ according to whether the 
value of the assets is in one of the following three groups: the bottom sextile (the 
6-quantile) of the sample, the top sextile, or between these two. As it will become 
clear, this particular specification has no important effect on the results. 
Alongside size, in our baseline specification we also include leverage. The 
reason for including leverage is clear: highly-levered banks are more likely to require 
bailing out. Importantly, we include dummies for the bank’s state of incorporation 
in some of the regressions (there are banks from 38 states in our sample). We want 
to make sure that our results are not simply an artifact of differences in corporate 
law across states. 
 
5.1  MID and bailouts 
 
In Table IX we report our first set of results. The table shows the marginal effects 
of the independent variables (evaluated at the means of the data) on the 
probability of bailouts. We report z-statistics within brackets, below the estimated 
effects. Our main variable of interest is the MID variable, which is measured as of 
2003 (the earliest date for which we have data). Such a strategy is feasible because 
the MID variable is quite persistent. In Column (a) we present the result of a 
univariate Probit regression, in which the MID is the only variable on the right-
hand side. We find that banks with insulated managers are 19 percentage points 
less likely to be bailed out. The economic significance of this effect is substantial, 
as the percentage of banks that were bailed out in our sample is 56%. This effect 
is statistically precise, being 3.085 standard errors away from zero. This effect is 
also identical to the 19 percentage point effect found in the nonparametric 
univariate analysis, which is reported in Table VII. 
In Column (b) we add a first set of controls: size variables and leverage. The 
effect of the MID is basically unchanged. We find that larger banks are indeed 
more likely to be bailed out. The estimated slopes are roughly similar across the 
three size groups. Indeed, the results are basically identical in (unreported) 
regressions in which size is broken down into a different number of groups (either 
more or fewer groups). Leverage appears to be positively related to bailouts. In 
Column (c) we add state dummies. The number of observations is reduced because 
there are ten states with just one bank in the sample. Despite the loss of pure 
cross-state variation, all estimated effects remain roughly unchanged. The 
statistical precision of the estimates falls due to a dramatic reduction in degrees of 
freedom, but still remains at adequate levels. 
In Column (d) we include an additional set of control variables: board 
independence (as a proportion of board size), the proportion of independent 
directors with previous banking experience, a 20% block ownership dummy, the 
ownership stake of the insider with the largest interest in the bank, the number of 
acquisitions from 2003 to 2006, the fraction of variable pay over the total 
compensation for the highest paid director (which is typically the CEO), and (the 
natural logarithm of) the total compensation for the highest paid director. The 
effect of management insulation on the probability of bailouts is virtually 
unchanged in this specification: banks with insulated managers are 22 percentage 
points less likely to be bailed out. Regarding the other control variables, we note 
that the effect of leverage is now larger and statistically stronger. The number of 
acquisitions appears to be positively related to bailouts (not shown in the table). 
The number of acquisitions is strongly correlated with bank size, and we cannot 
rule out the possibility that its positive effect on bailouts is simply a consequence 
of the too big to fail effect. This interpretation is strengthened by the fact that the 
inclusion of the acquisition variable reduces the statistical precision of the size 
variables (this is also verified in unreported regressions). 
Our preliminary conclusion is that the Management Insulation Dummy is a 
robust predictor of bank bailouts. Its predictive power is not diminished by the 
inclusion of alternative governance variables, such as the presence of large block 
holders, board independence, board experience, and compensation variables. 
Saturating the model with covariates and state dummies has virtually no effect on 
the estimated marginal effects of management insulation. 
It is important to clarify our interpretation of these results. The evidence 
shows that our measure of shareholder empowerment (the negative of management 
insulation) in 2003 predicts bailouts in 2008-09, after controlling for a set of other 
bank characteristics. It does not mean that shareholder interference “caused” the 
bailouts. First, in general we cannot ascertain causality from predictive regressions, 
as we cannot rule out the possibility that charters and bylaws are endogenously 
determined alongside bank policies that might have affected bank performance 
during the crisis or banks’ incentives to apply for government support. Second, in 
a literal sense, laws, charters and bylaws (or any other governance variable) cannot 
directly cause bank bailouts; bailouts are ultimately determined by some ex ante 
actions by bank executives and some other variables outside their control (i.e., 
luck, politics, etc.). That is, if we could directly observe those ex ante actions and 
include them in our predictive regressions, we would expect the coefficient on the 
MID variable to be zero. Thus, the best one could hope for is to find out whether 
our management insulation index correlates with some of these ex ante actions 
that led to bank bailouts. The fact that the MID variable is a robust predictor of 
bailouts suggests that shareholder empowerment correlates with a set of ex ante 
decisions that eventually led to bailouts. We investigate this possibility in Section 
6 below. 
We next consider the effects of changes in the Management Insulation Index. 
Such changes happen infrequently and are typically a consequence of modifications 
to the bank’s charter or bylaws. In our data, a change in the MI-index occurs in 
less than 5% of the bank-years between 2003 and 2006. We postulate that changes 
that reduce the Management Insulation Index are suggestive of episodes of 
shareholder activism, either explicit or implicit (for example, by the threat of exit 
– the “Wall Street walk”). We create a variable that measures the changes in the 
MI-index between 2003 and 2006. We interpret this variable as a proxy for recent 
shareholder interference (that is, negative changes mean that shareholders are more 
empowered, while positive changes mean the opposite). The average change from 
2003 to 2006 is just 0.024 (see Table IV). From 2003 to 2006, we find 23 annual 
decreases in MI-index, and 21 annual increases in MI-index (results not tabulated). 
There are a few cases of major changes, such as from 1 to 6 and from 6 to 2 (see 
Table IV). 
Column (e) of Table IX reports the results of a regression using the same 
specification as in Column (d), but now including the change in MI-index as an 
additional right-hand side variable. We first note that the inclusion of this variable 
increases the point estimate of the marginal effect of MID. In this specification, 
banks with insulated managers are 26.5 percentage points less likely to be bailed 
out. This effect also appears to be more statistically precise, at roughly 2.57 
standard errors from zero. We also find that the change in MI-index has a strong 
effect on the probability of bailouts: A one-point reduction in the index increases 
the probability of a bailout by roughly 13 percentage points. This effect is 
statistically precise, with a z-statistic of -2.1. We conclude that recent changes in 
the management insulation index from 2003 to 2006 contain information that helps 
explain the cross-section of bank bailouts. This information goes beyond that 
contained in the Management Insulation Dummy in 2003. 
Although it is impossible to rule out omitted variables as an explanation for 
our findings, the pattern of estimated marginal effects as more controls are added 
is reassuring. In virtually all cases in Table IX, the inclusion of additional controls 
tends to make the results stronger (in an economic sense). Because controls do not 
appear to make the estimated effects weaker, it seems unlikely that by simply 
adding more controls one could eventually find the key missing variable. For 
omitted variables to explain away the effect of the MID variable, we would need 
to find additional variables that are weakly correlated with the controls included 
in the specifications in Table IX. For example, suppose that we thought that bank 
size could explain the effect of the MID. Our flexible specification for bank size is 
surely still quite imperfect, thus one could make a case for adding more and better 
proxies for size. However, one would need to find an alternative size variable that 
is only weakly correlated with book assets, but strongly correlated with the MID 
variable. In other words, the common factor between such a variable and the MID 
must be different than the common factor among all size variables.  
 
5.2  ED and bailouts 
 
In Table X we replicate the regressions in Table IX, now with the ED (the 
Entrenchment Dummy) replacing the MID. The sample size is reduced because of 
missing data. We again find that management insulation (measured by the ED) is 
negatively related to the probability of bailout. However, the marginal effects are 
economically small and statistically weak. In Column (f), we add both ED and the 
MID to the regression. We find that the MID remains a robust predictor of 
bailouts, with a marginal effect very similar to those reported in Table IX. The 
previously (small) negative effect of ED on bailouts vanishes as the MID is 
included. Such a comparison suggests that, despite the positive correlation between 
the MID and the ED, the ability of the MID to predict bailouts comes exactly from 
those components of MID that are uncorrelated with the ED.9 
Finally, in unreported regressions, we replace the MID variable with the 
Board Classification Dummy. We find that, even after dropping the MID variable 
from the regression, the marginal effects of the classified board variable are both 
economically and statistically insignificant, with the exception of the univariate 
specification, where the estimated coefficient is borderline significant. 
Our tentative conclusion is that the Management Insulation Dummy is a 
more precise measure of management entrenchment than either the E-dummy (or 
the E-Index) or the Board Classification Dummy. In large samples, both the ED 
and the Board Classification Dummy may work well, as they are indeed correlated 
with management entrenchment. However, in small samples, such as ours, a less 
                                      
9 Replacing the ED with the E-index yields very similar results. 
noisy measure is required. The Management Insulation Index aims at being a more 
precise measure of management insulation. This additional precision is valuable, 
not only for obtaining statistically significant results in small samples, but, 
crucially, for obtaining economically meaningful estimates in samples of any size. 
 
5.3 Management insulation and shareholder activism 
 
In this subsection, we ask a basic question, which is crucial for the interpretation 
of the evidence: Are banks with high management insulation scores really more 
insulated from shareholder pressure? In other words, we ask whether our 
interpretation of the MI-index is justified. 
Shareholder pressure is very difficult to measure, as most shareholder 
activism activity occurs behind the scenes. However, it is possible to identify 
shareholder activism events in some cases when changes in ownership stakes require 
filing with the SEC. Section 13d and Regulation 13D of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934 require that an investor who crosses a 5% beneficial ownership 
threshold in a publicly traded company must file a Schedule 13D form, unless that 
investor does not intend to change or influence the control of the corporation. If 
less insulated banks are subject to shareholder pressure, we would expect to see 
more 13D filings in relation to banks with low MI scores, and fewer such filings in 
relation to banks with higher MI scores. 
In Table XI, Columns (a) and (b), we explore the relationship between the 
MID and the likelihood of activist investors taking a substantial equity position in 
the bank (as proxied by filings of Schedule 13D). We find that banks with the 
highest level of insulation in 2003 were between 16-19 percentage points less likely 
to experience a Schedule 13D filing in 2003-2007. This evidence suggests that banks 
with higher management insulation scores in 2003 were more likely to experience 
episodes of shareholder activism between 2003 and 2007.  
By contrast, Columns (c) and (d) reveal that the ED variable is not robustly 
correlated with Schedule 13D filings. Column (e) shows that the MID robustly 
predicts bailouts even when the ED variable is included in the regression. Overall, 
the evidence in Table XI again suggests that the MID contains information that is 
not available in the ED. 
 
6  Investigating the Mechanism 
 
We consider five (non-mutually exclusive) explanations for the negative relation 
between management insulation and the probability of bailouts. First, management 
insulation may be correlated with some non-performance-related reasons to apply 
for and receive CPP funds. Second, management insulation may be correlated with 
decisions that made banks weaker during the crisis and, because of weakness, such 
banks did not qualify for CPP investments. Third, insulated managers may have 
chosen not to apply for bailout funds, even if they needed funds. Fourth, insulated 
managers may have rejected bailout funds. Finally, management insulation may 
be correlated with decisions that made banks stronger during the crisis, leading to 
fewer bailouts. Here we investigate each of these explanations in turn to see 
whether they survive further scrutiny. 
 
6.1  Non-performance-related reasons to receive CPP funds 
  
Banks with serious liquidity needs had no option but to apply for CPP funds. 
Participation in the CPP is, however, a less reliable indicator of bank performance 
during the crisis where reasons other than financial necessity played a role in banks’ 
decisions to accept a bailout. A particular concern is that large banks that were 
considered systemically important by government regulators may have had little 
choice but to accept CPP funds, regardless of whether managers felt that their 
institutions needed a bailout. To address this concern, Column (a) of Table XII 
reports the output of regressions in which we exclude the largest sextile (by 2006 
book assets) from our sample. Following the exclusion of this group the MID 
remains a robust predictor of bailouts. 
If managers of strong banks, due to pressure from the regulator or otherwise, 
accepted CPP funds, such managers were incentivized to exit CPP as early as 
possible in order to avoid the restrictions on executive compensation linked to CPP 
participation (Bayazitova and Shivdasani (2012)). Accordingly, omitting banks 
that took and repaid CPP funds within a year following the commencement of the 
program is likely to exclude from our sample many of the banks that took CPP 
funds for reasons other than financial necessity. 
In Column (b) of Table XII, we report the output of regressions excluding 
banks that repaid early. Finally, in Column (c) of Table XII we exclude both of 
these groups. Following the exclusion of both these groups the MID remains a 
robust predictor of bailouts. In additional unreported regressions we group the 
banks that repaid early together with the banks that did not receive any CPP 
funds; this regrouping has no significant impact on our results. 
Note also that the membership in the two groups excluded in (a) and (b) is 
highly correlated: 50% of the largest sextile of our sample banks had entirely repaid 
the received CPP funds by October 2009, while only roughly 10% of the remaining 
banks had done so. This also supports the hypothesis that some of the largest 
institutions in our sample participated in CPP because of their systemic 
importance and not because of financial necessity. 
The evidence thus suggests that, although CPP participation is also driven 
by reasons other than financial necessity, those reasons cannot explain the 
predictive power of management insulation for bank bailouts. 
 
6.2  Bank bailouts as a proxy for financial strength 
  
Some banks did not qualify for CPP capital injections or had their applications 
rejected because they were too weak (Bayazitova and Shivdasani, (2012); Duchin 
and Sosyura, (2014)). It is thus possible that our bailout dummy is a poor proxy 
for bank weakness, or perhaps worse, that it might be a proxy for bank strength. 
To consider this possibility, we first identify those banks that did not receive funds 
because they were too weak. These are banks that were closed by the FDIC shortly 
after the CPP was announced, banks that stated that they could not issue preferred 
shares because they had already defaulted/delayed payment on subordinated debt, 
or banks with other clear reasons for not receiving funds due to weakness. There 
are 14 banks in this category. We also identify 8 banks that did not receive funds 
and subsequently failed (as of 2010). We then create two new indicator variables. 
The first one, which we call “bailout + weak bank dummy,” is equal to 1 if a bank 
either is bailed out or is weak but is not bailed out. The second variable, which we 
call “bailout + weak + failed banks,” is equal to the first one except that it also 
includes the failed banks in the group of bailed out and weak banks. These two 
new variables are arguably less noisy proxies for poor performance. 
In Table XIII, Columns (a) and (b), we report the output of regressions 
using the same specification as in Column (e) of Table IX (which is the one with 
the largest set of controls), but replacing the bailout variable with these two 
different indicator variables. We find that the results become stronger. Now those 
banks with MID=1 are about 33 to 35 percentage points less likely to be poor 
performers. As these results are directly comparable to those from Table IX, the 
evidence here supports an interpretation in which management insulation may 
have made some banks stronger. 
 
6.3  Management insulation and incentives to apply for CPP funds 
 
The negative relation between management insulation and the acceptance of CPP 
funds could be explained by badly-governed banks choosing not to apply for these 
funds. For example, Cadman, Carter and Lynch (2012) show evidence that 
compensation restrictions affected TARP participation. In that case, we expect the 
negative relation between management insulation and the decision to apply for 
CPP funds to be even stronger than that between management insulation and 
bailouts. To test this hypothesis, we create an indicator variable that takes the 
value of 1 if a bank applied for CPP funds. We assume that all banks that received 
CPP funds applied for them. Of the remaining banks, we identify 34 banks that 
did apply for the funds, but did not get them. This information comes from the 
banks’ company reports, such as 10-Ks, annual reports, or documents on their web 
pages. 
From Table XIII, Column (c), we see that the MID variable has a negative 
effect on the probability of applying for funds. This effect is, however, economically 
smaller than that of the bailout variable and is statistically imprecise. This result 
is explained by the fact that a large number of banks that applied for CPP funds, 
but did not get them, had the highest insulation scores. This evidence is difficult 
to reconcile with an interpretation in which badly-governed banks choose not to 
apply for bailout funds. 
Some banks that received CPP funds exited from the program very early. 
An early exit could also be a symptom of bad governance. Bayazitova and 
Shivdasani (2012) show evidence that banks with high levels of CEO compensation 
were more likely to exit CPP early. Wilson and Wu (2012) argue that there was 
no compelling economic reason to repay CPP investments early, leaving open the 
possibility that badly-governed banks chose to exit the program against the 
interests of their shareholders. To address this possibility, we identify 23 banks 
that received CPP funds but repaid these funds at or before October 2009. We use 
this information to refine our CPP application dummy, which now classifies those 
banks that exited early in the same group as those that did not apply. We report 
the results in Table XIII, column (d). The estimated effect of the MID variable on 
the probability of applying for funds and not repaying them early is economically 
weaker than that reported in column (c), and its statistical precision is weak. 
 
6.4  Management insulation and rejection of CPP funds 
 
The strong correlation between management insulation and the probability of 
receiving CPP is not fully explained by the decision to apply for CPP funds. It is 
thus likely that some banks with MID=1 applied for CPP funds but did not get 
them. There are two main reasons for a bank not to receive CPP funds, conditional 
on applying for such funds. As discussed above, some banks were too weak to 
qualify for such funds. But we already know from Column (a) that MID=1 banks 
were less likely to be denied funds because they were weak. Alternatively, some 
banks had their applications approved, but rejected the CPP investments. The 
latter banks were relatively strong, as evidenced by the approval of funds and the 
fact that they believed that they could go on without such funds. 
In Column (e) of Table XIII we estimate the probability of rejecting CPP 
funds, conditional on approval. The sample is restricted to those banks that had 
their applications approved. We find that banks with MID=1 are 27.6 percentage 
points more likely to reject CPP funds after approval. This result again casts doubt 
on the hypothesis that banks with insulated managers did not receive funds because 
they were weak. We conclude that insulated banks were less likely to be bailed out 
partly because some of these banks rejected pre-approved CPP funds.  
 
6.5  Management insulation and bank choices 
 
If management insulation is related to different choices in the period before the 
crisis, what are these choices? Here we investigate the relation between 
management insulation and some accounting variables that might be informative 
about bank choices prior to the crisis. 
Using accounting data to assess pre-CPP bank strength is problematic. 
Accounting data such as leverage ratios are likely to be an opaque and noisy 
measure of the risk of a bank’s asset profile, as such ratios are not informative 
about the risk attributes of the asset portfolio itself. Likewise, even risk-based 
capital ratios are similarly opaque and noisy due to their regulatory use,10 and 
because their calculation, pre-crisis, was based on assumptions that were proven 
incorrect by the ensuing financial crisis.11 In unreported regressions, we find only 
weak evidence of associations between management insulation and traditional 
proxies for risk and performance, such as leverage, accounting performance, stock 
market performance, non-performing loans, and measures of volatility prior to the 
crisis. 
We next investigate the relation between management insulation and 
variables related to bank scope. The first variable that we consider is the ratio of 
non-interest income over net interest income. Non-interest income is a (possibly 
                                      
10See section 38 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Act and section 325.103 of the FDIC 
Rules and Regulations (12 C.F.R. § 325.103). For investment bank conglomerates, see the voluntary 
regime under the Supervised Investment Bank Holding Company Rules (now repealed), 17 CFR § 
240.17i–7. 
11For example, in the last Form 10-Q Lehman Brothers filed before its bankruptcy (Q2 2008), its 
reported Total Risk-Based Capital Ratio exceeded the equivalent figures reported by both 
JPMorgan Chase and Goldman Sachs. 
noisy) measure of a commercial bank’s focus on noncore activities, such as 
investment banking and trading. Brunnermeier, Dong, and Palia (2012) argue that 
banks with higher non-interest income ratios contribute more to systemic risk than 
banks that focus more on deposit taking and lending. They also show that banks 
have increased their non-interest income ratios in the years prior to the crisis; the 
largest increases happened between 2000 and 2003. However, in their sample – as 
well as in ours – the average non-interest income ratio decreases between 2003 and 
2006 (see our Table VI and Brunnermeier et al’s Figure 1). 
In Table XIV we consider the correlations between bank characteristics in 
2003 and the subsequent change in non-interest income ratios. The dependent 
variable is the log of the 2006 non-interest income ratio divided by the 2003 non-
interest income ratio:  
 
Change in NII ≡ ln (
Non−interest income
Net interest income
)
06
− ln (
Non−interest income
Net interest income
)
03
 .             (2) 
 
We use the same variables as before as covariates. The size of the sample 
falls because of missing data. We find that banks with the highest management 
insulation scores experience larger reductions in their non-interest ratios than those 
banks with low management insulation scores. To understand the economic 
significance of these results, consider for example the point estimate of -0.21 in the 
first row of Column (a) (Table XIV). This coefficient roughly means that, 
compared to an otherwise identical low-insulation bank with no change in its non-
interest income ratio, a high-insulation bank would have decreased its non-interest 
income ratio by 21%. From Table VI, we see that the average (log) change in NII 
between 2006 and 2003 is -23.2%. The estimates thus suggest that a large fraction 
of the decrease in NII comes from banks with high management insulation scores. 
We next consider Level 3 assets as an alternative measure of a bank’s focus 
on less traditional banking activities. L3 assets are assets, such as financial 
instruments (SFAS 133, 2008), that are reported at fair value determined through 
the application of a financial model for which there are no observable market inputs 
(SFAS 157, 2006). We postulate that a bank’s L3 assets as a percentage of its total 
assets is indicative of the extent of the bank’s focus on trading of complex, opaque 
and illiquid securities. We take L3 assets from the financial statements for the 
fiscal years beginning after November 15, 2007, the first year that US GAAP 
required the reporting of this information. This fiscal year end is the closest in time 
to the implementation of the CPP program, which was announced on October 14, 
2008. 12 
Table XV reports the results of regressions in which the percentage of L3 
assets is regressed on the management insulation dummy and a number of other 
bank characteristics. We find that banks with MID=1 in 2003 end up with less 
0.512 percentage points in L3 assets in 2008 than banks with MID=0 (see Column 
(a)). This effect is economically strong: the average percentage of L3 assets in our 
sample is 0.56% and the standard deviation is 1.26% (see Table VI). One caveat 
here is that about half of the banks used in Column (a) had no L3 assets (116 out 
of 240). The OLS regression in Column (a) is thus necessarily misspecified. In 
Column (b) we then ask a different question: Does the MID affect the percentage 
of L3 assets among those banks with nonzero L3 assets? The answer is yes. The 
results are now statistically weaker, but this is to be expected because the sample 
is halved. The point estimate of -0.771 of the coefficient on the MID variable 
translates into a marginal effect of -0.428 percentage points, for a bank with the 
average amount of L3 assets (0.56%). 
The evidence in this subsection is only suggestive, thus our conclusions are 
tentative. Banks with high management insulation scores appear to have been 
focused more on traditional commercial banking activities (deposit taking and 
lending) than those banks with low management insulation scores. Such a 
difference in the scope of bank activities is reflected in the different levels of non-
interest income ratios and L3 assets.  
 
6.6  Summary and interpretation 
 
Management insulation in 2003 predicts bank bailouts in 2008-9 in large part 
because high-insulation banks rejected bailout funds after these funds had been 
approved (Subsection 6.4). There are two potential explanations for this refusal to 
receive bailout funds. First, insulated banks may have chosen to forgo cheap funds 
because managers preferred to preserve flexibility, e.g., to avoid regulator-imposed 
restrictions on executive compensation. Second, insulated banks may have chosen 
to forgo these funds because they were not liquidity constrained. These two 
explanations are not mutually exclusive. In fact, they are likely to be 
complementary; only banks in good financial shape could afford the luxury of 
forgoing what was then perceived as cheap capital. The evidence strongly suggests 
                                      
12 Existing research suggests that the Level-3 assets variable contains useful information. For 
example, Riedl and Sarafeim (2011) consider level-three assets as a proxy for information risk.  
that high-insulation banks were indeed financially stronger (Subsection 6.2). One 
possible reason for the better shape of such banks is their choice of a more 
conservative asset and income composition profile (Subsection 6.5). 
Why are insulated banks more conservative? One possibility is that 
governance arrangements influence bank risk taking. Implicit or explicit state 
guarantees reduce bank creditors’ incentives to discipline equity’s risk shifting 
incentives (Jensen and Meckling (1976)). These guarantees may also make equity 
safer. Kelly, Lustig and Van Nieuwerburgh (2012) provide evidence that 
government guarantees to the financial sector have positive spillover effects on 
equity holders, and also that the implicit bailout promises are priced in the market. 
It may be that, in banks in which shareholders are less empowered, executives may 
have more scope to give effect to their own risk preferences, which, due to the less 
diversified nature of their human capital investments, are less risk-friendly than 
those of shareholders.  
 
7  Final Remarks 
 
The main contribution of this paper is to illustrate the usefulness of interpretable 
corporate governance indices. We develop an index of management insulation from 
shareholder pressure, which we call the Management Insulation Index (MI-index). 
The MI-index is an attempt to answer the question of how core corporate law rules 
make it more or less time-consuming to replace an incumbent board. We show that 
this index contains information that is useful for predicting bank bailouts during 
the crisis, and we find that this metric is more informative that the existing leading 
index and other governance variables. Going forward, we note that the 
methodology that we develop to construct the index is not specific to financial 
firms. This methodology may prove useful in future studies on the costs and 
benefits of shareholder empowerment. 
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Table I – Management Insulation Scores 2003-2007 
This table shows the number of US commercial banks in each of the six management 
insulation scores described in Figure 1. The sample size (276) is determined by the 
availability of constitutional documents for the entire 2003-2007 timeframe and other 
bank characteristics that are used in our analysis.  
Insulation score Year 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
1 41 40 37 34 36 
2 72 74 76 79 83 
3 20 17 18 21 18 
4 40 42 44 41 39 
5 17 15 14 13 12 
6 86 88 87 88 88 
      
Total 276 276 276 276 276 
 
Table II – Management Insulation Variables and Board 
Classification: Average Values 2003-2007 
This table shows cross–sectional average values per year of the Management Insulation 
Index (MII), the Management Insulation Dummy (MID), and the Board Classification 
Dummy (BCD). The MII variable classifies each bank into one of the six insulation 
scores described in Figure 1 and, in more details, in the Appendix. The MID variable 
equals 1 if MII=5 or MII=6, and zero otherwise. The BCD variable equals 1 if the bank 
has a classified board and zero otherwise. The sample size is 276 in each year. 
Year Variable 
 Management 
Insulation 
Index - MII 
Management 
Insulation 
Dummy - MID 
Board 
Classification 
Dummy -BCD 
2003 3.64 0.38 0.77 
2004 3.66 0.38 0.77 
2005 3.66 0.37 0.76 
2006 3.67 0.37 0.75 
2007 3.62 0.37 0.73 
 
 
Table III – Classified-board Banks with Low Insulation Scores 
This table shows the percentage of banks for which the Board Classification Dummy 
equals 1 and the Management Insulation Dummy equals zero. 
 Year 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Percentage 39.5% 39.9% 39.1% 38.4% 36.6% 
Table IV – Entrenchment Index Scores 
This table shows the distribution of E-Index across the sample. Average values for the MID 
are reported for comparison purposes. 
E-index 2003 2006 
Mean of 
MID 
(2003) 
0 8 5 0.00 
1 13 18 0.00 
2 45 39 0.18 
3 35 37 0.31 
4 76 77 0.51 
5 60 61 0.48 
6 17 17 0.71 
    
 Total 254 254 0.39 
Table V – Correlation of MI-Index and E-Index in 2003 
This table shows the pairwise correlations between the Management Insulation Index and 
the E-Index for 2003. Asterisks indicate significance at 0.01 (***), 0.05 (**), and 0.10 (*) 
levels. The E-Index Dummy (ED) takes the value of one if the E-index is between 4 and 6 
for 2003. 
  MI Index MID  E-Index  ED 
MI Index 1.00       
  276       
MID  0.87 *** 1.00     
  276 276     
E-Index 0.31 *** 0.36 *** 1.00   
  254 254 254   
ED 0.29 *** 0.35 *** 0.85 *** 1.00 
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Table VI – Bank Characteristics: Summary Statistics 
This table shows the summary of some bank characteristics. The bailout dummy equals 1 if the bank 
received CPP funds in 2008-09. The change in management insulation variable is the change in the MII 
variable from 2003 to 2006. Bailed out or weak banks corrects the bailout dummy by adding those 
banks that were too weak to receive CPP funds. Bailed out or weak banks or failed banks further 
corrects that dummy by adding banks that subsequent failed. Applied for CPP is a dummy for banks 
that applied to the CPP program, and Applied for CPP and no early repayment adjusts that variable 
by correcting for banks that repaid early. Approved, but rejected CPP is a dummy variable indicating 
those banks that rejected CPP after having been approved. The number of acquisitions 2003-2006 is 
the count of control stakes (>50%) acquired in other banks from 2003 to 2006 inclusive. All the other 
variables are for bank-years between 2003 and 2007. The classified board dummy equals 1 if the bank 
has a classified board. Book value of assets is measured in millions of US dollars. Leverage is the book 
value of assets divided by the book value of total equity. ROE is net income over equity. Board 
independence is the proportion of independent directors on the board. Board directors’ banking 
experience is the proportion of independent directors with previous managerial experience in the banking 
industry. The block ownership dummy (20%) indicates the presence of at least one shareholder with an 
ownership stake of 20% or more. Inside owner (in %) denotes the ownership stake of the insider with 
the largest interest in the bank. HPD denotes the highest paid director in a bank, typically the CEO. 
Change in Non-Interest Income is the change of a banks’ log-ratio of non-interest income to net interest 
income between 2003 and 2006. L3 Assets is the percentage of Level 3 assets over all assets. 
 Summary Statistics 
Variable  mean st. dev. min max n 
Bailout dummy  0.560 0.497 0 1 1267 
Change in management insulation (2003-06)  0.024 0.748 -4 5 1267 
Bailed out or weak banks  0.610 0.488 0 1 1267 
Bailed out or weak banks or failed banks  0.637 0.481 0 1 1267 
Applied for CPP  0.679 0.467 0 1 1267 
Applied for CPP and no early repayment  0.592 0.492 0 1 1267 
Approved, but rejected CPP  0.090 0.286 0 1 1267 
Classified board dummy  0.757 0.429 0 1 1267 
Book assets  23,184 135,195 76 1,715,746 1267 
Leverage  11.384 3.290 2.512 38.307 1267 
ROE  0.106 0.065 -0.622 0.391 1267 
Number of acquisitions (2003-06)  2.114 5.273 0 52 1267 
Board independence  0.735 0.134 0 0.944 1267 
Board directors’ banking experience  0.181 0.159 0 0.800 1267 
Block ownership dummy (20%)  0.088 0.284 0 1 1267 
Inside owner  2.547 6.075 0 50.030 636 
HPD variable pay (over total pay)  0.241 0.224 0 1 1231 
Total HPD pay (in thousands)  1,632 4,414 18 54,000 1230 
Change in Non-Interest Income (2003-06)  -0.232 0.429 -1.977 1.177 919 
L3 Assets (2008)  0.556 1.262 0 8.292 1128 
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Table VII – Bank Characteristics: Sample Averages Conditional on 
Management Insulation Dummy in 2003 
This table shows the sample averages of selected bank characteristics in 2006, conditional on 
the 2003 value of the Management Insulation Dummy (MID). The bailout dummy equals 1 if 
the bank received CPP money in 2008-09. The number of acquisitions 2003-2006 is the count 
of control stakes (>50%) acquired in other banks from 2003 to 2006 inclusive. All the other 
variables are from 2006. The classified board dummy equals 1 if the bank had a classified board 
in 2006. Book value of assets is measured in millions of US dollars. Leverage is the book value 
of assets divided by the book value of total equity. Return on equity (ROE) is net income over 
common equity. Board independence is the fraction of independent directors on the board. 
Board directors’ banking experience is the fraction of independent directors with previous 
managerial experience in the banking industry. The block ownership dummy (20%) indicates 
the presence of at least one shareholder with an ownership stake of 20% or more. Inside owner 
(in %) denotes the ownership stake of the insider with the largest interest in the bank. 
 Average Values Conditional on MID 
Variable  MID = 0 MID = 1 
Bailout dummy  0.62 0.43 
Classified board dummy  0.62 0.97 
Book assets (mean)  23,535 26,034 
Book assets (median)  1,554 1,038 
Leverage  11.05 11.14 
Return on Equity (ROE)  11.08 9.97 
Number of acquisitions 2003-2006  1.58 1.84 
Board independence  0.76 0.72 
Board directors’ banking experience  0.17 0.19 
Block ownership dummy (20%)  0.09 0.10 
Inside owner  7.69 7.43 
    
Number of observations  172 104 
 
Table VIII – Bank Characteristics: Sample Averages Conditional 
on Entrenchment Dummy in 2003 
This table shows the sample averages of selected bank characteristics in 2006, conditional on 
the 2003 value of the Entrenchment Dummy (ED). The remaining variables are as in Table 
VII. 
 Average Values Conditional on ED 
Variable  ED = 0 ED = 1 
Bailout dummy  0.58 0.52 
Classified board dummy  0.51 0.90 
Book assets (mean)  31,875 21,108 
Book assets (median)  1,261 1,832 
Leverage  10.98 11.14 
Return on Equity (ROE)  12.43 10.73 
Number of acquisitions 2003-2006  1.41 1.91 
Board independence  0.76 0.74 
Board directors’ banking experience  0.19 0.17 
Block ownership dummy (20%)  0.11 0.08 
Inside owner  4.03 4.16 
    
Number of observations  105 153 
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Table IX – Marginal Effects of Management Insulation on 
the Probability of Bailouts (2008/09) 
This table shows results of Probit regressions of bank bailouts on bank characteristics. The sample 
consists of all US banks for which data are available. The dependent variable – the bailout dummy – 
is equal to one if the bank received CPP money in 2008-09. The Management Insulation Dummy 
(MID) is from 2003. The change in management insulation variable is the change in the MII variable 
from 2003 to 2006. The small size dummy indicate banks in the lowest sextile (6-quantile) of the sample 
size distribution, as measure by book assets, the large size dummy indicate banks in the top sextile, 
and the medium size dummy indicates banks in between the bottom and the top sextiles. See Table 
VI for the definition of variables. All control variables are from 2006, unless otherwise stated. 
Additional controls include board independence, director banking experience, block ownership, inside 
ownership, number of acquisitions (2003-2006), and HPD compensation variables. Robust standard 
errors are clustered at state level. The reported coefficients represent marginal effects evaluated at the 
means of the data. Robust z-statistics are in brackets. Asterisks indicate significance at 0.01 (***), 0.05 
(**), and 0.10 (*) levels. 
Independent Variable Dependent Variable: Bailout dummy 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) 
Management Insulation Dummy-MID (2003) -0.191*** -0.182** -0.201** -0.221** -0.265** 
 [-3.085] [-2.215] [-2.036] [-2.004] [-2.573] 
Change in management insulation (2003-06)     -0.130** 
     [-2.103] 
Log assets times small size dummy  0.078 0.130 0.105 0.111 
  [1.410] [1.550] [0.809] [0.842] 
Log assets times medium size dummy  0.093** 0.149** 0.127 0.135 
  [2.196] [2.153] [1.097] [1.134] 
Log assets times large size dummy  0.094*** 0.135** 0.107 0.113 
  [2.883] [2.482] [1.062] [1.096] 
Leverage  0.019** 0.023** 0.040*** 0.039*** 
  [2.034] [2.074] [3.857] [4.099] 
      
State dummies No No Yes Yes Yes 
Additional controls No No No Yes Yes 
Observations 276 276 266 248 248 
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Table X – Marginal Effects of Entrenchment Index on the Probability 
of Bailouts (2008/09) 
This table shows results of Probit regressions of bank bailouts on bank characteristics. The sample 
consists of all US banks for which data are available. The dependent variable – the bailout dummy – 
is equal to one if the bank received CPP money in 2008-09. The E-index dummy (MID) is from 2003. 
The change in E-index is the change in this variable from 2003 to 2006. All other variables are as in 
Table IX. See Table VI for the definition of variables. All control variables are from 2006, unless 
otherwise stated. Additional controls include board independence, director banking experience, block 
ownership, inside ownership, number of acquisitions (2003-2006), and HPD compensation variables. 
Robust standard errors are clustered at state level. The reported coefficients represent marginal effects 
evaluated at the means of the data. Robust z-statistics are in brackets. Asterisks indicate significance 
at 0.01 (***), 0.05 (**), and 0.10 (*) levels. 
 
Independent Variable Dependent Variable: Bailout dummy 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) 
E-Index dummy (ED) (2003) -0.058 -0.090 -0.067 -0.082 -0.053 0.025 
 [-0.832] [-1.323] [-0.759] [-0.807] [-0.547] [0.277] 
Change in E-Index (2003-06)     0.040 0.092 
     [0.617] [1.288] 
Management Insulation Dummy-MID (2003)      -0.278** 
      [-2.434] 
Change in management insulation (2003-06)      -0.184** 
      [-2.263] 
Log assets times small size dummy  0.102** 0.159** 0.140 0.148 0.112 
  [2.065] [2.335] [1.329] [1.325] [0.815] 
Log assets times medium size dummy  0.107*** 0.168*** 0.155* 0.161 0.134 
  [2.869] [3.026] [1.655] [1.633] [1.112] 
Log assets times large size dummy  0.104*** 0.151*** 0.129 0.135 0.116 
  [3.431] [3.359] [1.551] [1.554] [1.117] 
Leverage  0.019** 0.021* 0.039*** 0.040*** 0.041*** 
  [1.968] [1.798] [4.169] [4.394] [4.387] 
       
State dummies No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Additional controls No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 258 258 248 236 232 232 
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Table XI –  Schedule 13D Filings and Managerial Insulation Measures 
This table shows results of Probit regressions of Schedule 13D filings during the period 2003 –  2007 on 
bank characteristics. The sample consists of all US banks for which data are available. The dependent 
variable –  the “ Schedule 13D Filing Dummy”  –  is equal to one if at least one Schedule 13D was filed 
between 2003 and 2007, and is zero otherwise. All control variables are from 2006, unless otherwise 
stated. All controls include log assets times small, medium, and large dummies, leverage, board 
independence, director banking experience, block ownership, inside ownership, number of acquisitions 
(2003-2006), and HPD compensation variables. See Tables VI and IX for the definition of these variables. 
Robust standard errors are clustered on state level. The reported coefficients represent marginal effects 
evaluated at the means of the data. Robust z-statistics are in brackets. Asterisks indicate significance 
at 0.01 (***), 0.05 (**), and 0.10 (*) levels. 
Independent Variable Dependent Variable: Schedule 13D Filing Dummy 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) 
Management Insulation Dummy-MID (2003) -0.156** -0.187***   -0.244*** 
 [-2.335] [-2.773]   [-2.662] 
Change in management insulation (2003-06)  -0.093   -0.096* 
  [-1.614]   [-1.806] 
E-Index dummy (ED) (2003)   -0.056 -0.048 0.014 
   [-0.694] [-0.630] [0.159] 
Change in E-Index (2003-06)    -0.003 0.035 
    [-0.034] [0.394] 
      
State dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
All controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 234 234 224 220 220 
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Table XII – Excluding Largest Banks and Early Repayers 
This table shows results of Probit regressions of bank bailouts on bank characteristics for a reduced 
sample size. The regression in column (a) excludes the largest sextile (6-quantile) of the sample size 
distribution, as measured by 2006 book assets; column (b) excludes all banks that repaid the government 
funds received in full by October 2009; in column (c) the “early repayer group” (as in column (a)) and 
the largest sextile of our sample are both excluded. All control variables are from 2006, unless otherwise 
stated. Additional controls include board independence, director banking experience, block ownership, 
inside ownership, number of acquisitions (2003-2006), and HPD compensation variables. See Tables VI 
and IX for the definition of the remaining these variables. The reported coefficients represent marginal 
effects evaluated at the means of the data. Robust standard errors are clustered on state level. Asterisks 
indicate significance at 0.01 (***), 0.05 (**), and 0.10 (*) levels. 
Independent Variable  Dependent Variable: Bailout dummy 
 (a) (b) (c) 
Management Insulation Dummy-MID (2003) -0.286** -0.237** -0.256** 
 [-2.391] [-2.065] [-2.160] 
Change in management insulation (2003-06) -0.158** -0.126* -0.147** 
 [-2.365] [-1.956] [-2.170] 
Log assets times small size dummy 0.140 0.094 0.117 
 [1.107] [0.612] [0.908] 
Log assets times medium size dummy 0.160 0.113 0.134 
 [1.388] [0.808] [1.144] 
Log assets times large size dummy  0.083  
  [0.660]  
Leverage 0.057*** 0.045*** 0.059*** 
 [3.414] [4.293] [3.608] 
    
State dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Additional controls Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 207 224 192 
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Table XIII – Bailouts, Bank Strength, and the Decision to Participate 
This table shows results of Probit regressions of five different indicator variables on bank 
characteristics. The dependent variables are: (a) banks that received CPP funds in 2008-09 or did 
not receive funds because they were too weak, (b) the same as in (a) plus all banks that failed up 
to 2010, (c) banks that applied for CPP funds, (d) the same as in (c) but without those banks that 
repaid funds before October 2009, and (e) banks that rejected CPP for a subsample of banks that 
did apply and were approved for CPP. All the other variables are as in Table IX. Robust standard 
errors are clustered on state level. The reported coefficients represent marginal effects evaluated at 
the means of the data. The fraction of banks meeting the criteria is for: (a) 0.598, (b) 0.627, (c) 
0.670, (d) 0.587 and (e) 0.141. Robust z-statistics are in brackets. Asterisks indicate significance at 
0.01 (***), 0.05 (**), and 0.10 (*) levels. 
Independent Variable Dependent Variable 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) 
 Bailed out or 
weak banks 
Bailed out or 
weak banks or 
failed banks 
Applied for 
CPP 
Applied for CPP 
and no early 
repayment 
Approved, 
but rejected 
Management Insulation 
Dummy -MID (2003) 
-0.353*** -0.329*** -0.116 -0.067 0.276*** 
[-3.611] [-3.438] [-1.553] [-0.811] [3.121] 
Change in management 
insulation (2003-06) 
-0.102** -0.093** -0.097* -0.062 0.106** 
[-2.113] [-1.982] [-1.757] [-1.058] [2.197] 
Log assets times small 
size dummy 
0.061 0.048 0.114 0.046 0.006 
[0.491] [0.395] [1.076] [0.373] [0.081] 
Log assets times medium 
size dummy 
0.091 0.076 0.128 0.060 -0.020 
[0.839] [0.732] [1.377] [0.562] [-0.301] 
Log assets times large size 
dummy 
0.076 0.061 0.103 0.033 -0.018 
[0.801] [0.687] [1.319] [0.382] [-0.298] 
Leverage 0.059*** 0.059*** 0.035*** 0.003 -0.022 
 [4.572] [4.619] [3.222] [0.282] [-1.492] 
      
State dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
All other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes yes 
Observations 248 246 236 239 126 
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Table XIV – Banks’ Non-Interest Income 
This table shows results of OLS regressions of the change of a banks’ log-ratio of non-
interest income to net interest income between 2003 and 2006 on bank characteristics. 
The dependent variable is 
𝑙𝑛 (
𝑁𝑜𝑛 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
)
06
− 𝑙𝑛 (
𝑁𝑜𝑛 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
)
03
 
 
All the other variables are as in Table IX, but are based on 2003 values unless 
otherwise stated. Standard errors are clustered on state level. Robust t-statistics are 
in brackets. Asterisks indicate significance at 0.01 (***), 0.05 (**), and 0.10 (*) levels. 
 
Independent Variable 
Dependent Variable: 
Change in non-interest income 
(2003-06) 
 (a) (b) 
Management Insulation Dummy-MID (2003) -0.210*** -0.163*** 
[-3.687] [-3.153] 
Change in management insulation (2003-06) -0.041 -0.033 
[-1.590] [-1.009] 
Log assets times small size dummy 0.117 0.154** 
 [1.672] [2.179] 
Log assets times medium size dummy 0.087 0.126* 
 [1.592] [1.785] 
Log assets times large size dummy 0.066* 0.095* 
 [1.802] [1.736] 
Leverage -0.012** -0.007 
 [-2.117] [-0.386] 
   
State dummies Yes Yes 
Additional controls Yes Yes 
Observations 184 179 
R-squared 0.232 0.238 
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Table XV – Level 3 Assets 
This table shows results of OLS regressions of the percentage of assets classified as 
Level 3 assets on bank characteristics and the MID. The dependent variables are (a) 
Level 3 assets as a percentage of total assets in 2008 and (b) the natural logarithm 
of Level 3 assets as a percentage of total assets in 2008 for the sub-sample of banks 
with non-zero Level 3 assets. All the other variables are as in Table IX. Standard 
errors are clustered on state level. Robust t-statistics are in brackets. Asterisks 
indicate significance at 0.01 (***), 0.05 (**), and 0.10 (*) levels. 
 
Independent Variable Dependent Variable 
 (a) (b) 
 
Proportion Level 
3 Assets 
Proportion Level 
3 Assets (log) 
Management Insulation Dummy-MID (2003) -0.512** -0.771* 
[-2.640] [-1.764] 
Change in management insulation (2003-06) 0.119 0.193 
[1.017] [0.928] 
Log assets times small size dummy -0.087 0.242 
 [-0.420] [0.525] 
Log assets times medium size dummy -0.079 0.162 
 [-0.440] [0.430] 
Log assets times large size dummy -0.051 0.063 
 [-0.289] [0.186] 
Leverage 0.036 0.107** 
 [0.830] [2.143] 
   
State dummies Yes Yes 
Additional controls Yes Yes 
Observations 240 124 
R-squared 0.346 0.409 
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Figure 1 – The Management Insulation Index 
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Appendix – Detailed Description of the Management Insulation 
Index 
 
Index 
value 
Explanation 
6 
Corporations with an index value of 6 follow one of two “governance 
paths”. 
Path 1 (see boxes  1 - 2 - 4 - 8 - 10 – MI-index 6  in Figure 1 above) 
- The board is classified; 
- shareholders have no right to remove directors without cause; 
- the classification is contained in the corporation’s charter, meaning 
that a decision to declassify the board requires board approval; 
- shareholders are unable to gain control over the board by electing 
additional directors; 
- director nomination restriction determines whether the final 
outcome is MI-index5 or MI-index6.  
Corporations with a board classification in their by-laws also fall into 
this category if an amendment of the bylaws is subject to board 
approval (this can be stated in the charter or be a default rule under 
state corporate law).13 
 
Path 2 (see boxes  1 - 2 - 4 - 5 - 7 - 8- 10 – MI-index 6  in Figure 1 
above) 
- The board is classified; 
- shareholders have no right to remove directors without cause; 
- the classification of the board is not contained in the corporate 
charter, but in the by-laws; 
- shareholders can amend the by-laws to declassify the board; 
- following declassification the directors still cannot be removed 
without cause; 
                                      
13 Where bylaws can be amended by shareholders, but only by supermajority vote, we 
proceeded as follows: If the supermajority is calculated based on all outstanding shares, we 
assumed that shareholders will not be able, in effect, to amend the by-laws against the will 
of the incumbent management. Where only shareholders present at the meeting count, we 
assumed that supermajority requirements above 66 2/3% (typically 80%) render it effectively 
impracticable to rely on changes to the corporation's by-laws in order to gain control over 
the board. 
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- shareholders are unable to gain control over the board by electing 
additional directors; 
- director nomination restriction determines whether the final 
outcome is MI-index5 or MI-index6.  
Assessment: 
The boards of banks with an index value of 6 enjoy the maximum 
amount of “insulation” from shareholder pressure. The board is 
classified, meaning that only a third of the directors stand for re-
election each year. Thus, it takes shareholders about two years (two 
meetings) to reverse the corporation’s strategy by gaining control 
over the board. 
We ignore special meeting rights for MI-index-5 and MI-index-6 
banks: Shareholders can neither remove directors, nor add a relevant 
number of directors or declassify the board in a special meeting. 
Hence, we deem the existence of such a right to be irrelevant. 
As for restrictions to nominate directors:14 Such restrictions can limit 
the effectiveness of a proxy fight by giving the board enough time to 
react to activist shareholders. We note, however, that this is likely to 
be less relevant in MI-index-5 and MI-index-6 banks, since 
management is always secure for at least the time until the second-
next general meeting, effectively always allowing for sufficient 
“response time”. Such provisions can result in a prolonged period of 
insulation even for classified boards, particularly where an activist 
period commences before an annual general meeting but after the 
advanced notice cut-off date. 
 
Index 
value 
Explanation 
5 
Banks with an index value of 5 are effectively a variation of MI-
index-6 banks. They follow the same two “governance paths”, but 
there are no significant director nomination restrictions in place. 
Assessment: 
The absence of director nomination restrictions arguably slightly 
reduces the costs of gaining control over the board when compared to 
MI-index-6 banks. On the effect of such provisions on the difference 
                                      
14  We define director nomination restrictions as legal arrangements that require more than 
90 days advance notice for the nomination of directors by shareholders (and any rule more 
burdensome than this). 
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in insulation between MI-index-5 and MI-index-6 banks see the MI-
index-6 assessment above. 
 
 
4 
Corporations with an index value of 4 follow one of seven “governance paths”. 
Path 1 (see boxes  1 - 3 - 6 - 9 - 11 -  MI-index 4 ) 
- The board is not classified; 
- shareholders have no right to remove directors without cause; 
- but shareholders are able to gain control over the board by electing 
additional directors; 
- shareholders have no right to call a special meeting;15 
- there are some director nomination restrictions in place. 
Path 2 (see boxes  1 - 3 - 6 - 11 -  MI-index 4 ) 
- The board is not classified; 
- shareholders have no right to remove directors without cause; 
- shareholders are unable to gain control over the board by electing 
additional directors; 
- there are some director nomination restrictions in place. 
Path 3 (see boxes  1 - 3 - 9 - 11-  MI-index 4 ) 
- The board is not classified; 
- shareholders have the right to remove directors without cause; 
- shareholders have no right to call a special meeting; 
- there are some director nomination restrictions in place. 
Path 4 (see boxes  1 - 2 - 9 - 11-  MI-index 4 ) 
- The board is classified; 
- nevertheless, shareholders have the right to remove directors without 
cause; 
- shareholders have no right to call a special meeting; 
- there are some director nomination restrictions in place. 
Path 5 (see boxes  1 - 2 - 4 - 5 - 7 - 9 - 11-  MI-index 4 ) 
- The board is classified; 
- shareholders have no right to remove directors without cause; 
                                      
15  We treat the right to act by written consent (i.e. without a meeting) as equivalent to a 
special meeting right, unless acting without a meeting requires the written consent of the 
holders of all, or a supermajority of, outstanding shares. 
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- the classification of the board is not contained in the corporate charter, 
but in the by-laws; 
- shareholders can amend the by-laws to declassify the board; 
- the directors can now be removed without cause and are removed in the 
same meeting (presuming notice of removal has been given in accordance 
with the advanced notice bylaws); 
- shareholders have no right to call a special meeting; 
- there are some director nomination restrictions in place. 
Path 6 (see boxes  1 - 2 - 4 - 5 - 7 -8 - 9 - 11-  MI-index 4 )  
- The board is classified; 
- shareholders have no right to remove directors without cause; 
- the classification of the board is not contained in the corporate charter but 
in the by-laws; 
- shareholders can amend the by-laws to declassify the board; 
- the directors cannot now be removed without cause; 
- shareholders can, however, increase the size of the board to gain control; 
- shareholders have no right to call a special meeting; 
- there are some director nomination restrictions in place. 
Path 7 (see boxes  1 - 2 - 4 - 8 - 9 - 11 -  MI-index 4 ) 
- The board is classified; 
- shareholders have no right to remove directors without cause; 
- the classification of the board is contained in the corporate charter; 
- shareholders can, however, increase the size of the board to gain control; 
- shareholders have no right to call a special meeting; 
- there are some director nomination restrictions in place. 
Assessment: 
Banks with a MI-index value of 4 differ significantly from MI-index-6 banks. 
Even though the board may be classified (Paths 4-7), shareholders can 
effectively gain control over the board within a year. As Path 4 shows, even 
where the board is classified it is possible that shareholders retain the right to 
remove directors without cause. This renders the board classification 
irrelevant. Even without such a removal right, some corporations provide for 
classified boards in their by-laws only, and allow their shareholders to amend 
the relevant provisions. This means that shareholders can simply declassify 
the board, rendering the insulation typically offered by staggered boards 
irrelevant where declassification results in the application of a without cause 
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removal right (see Path 5). Note, however, that the declassification in itself 
does not typically affect the term of the incumbent directors.16 Furthermore, 
even where shareholders cannot remove directors without cause or declassify 
the board against the will of the management, shareholders are sometimes 
able to increase board size so as to outnumber the incumbent directors (Path 
6 and 7). These three sets of governance provisions result in a level of 
entrenchment equivalent to some banks with unclassified boards and without 
cause removal rights (Path 3).  
3 
Banks with an index value of 3 are effectively a variation of MI-index-4 
banks. They follow the same seven “governance paths”, but there are no 
significant director nomination restrictions in place. 
Assessment: 
Activist shareholders have to wait until the next general meeting to gain 
board control (see above). The absence of director nomination restrictions 
arguably slightly reduces the costs of gaining control over the board when 
compared to MI-index-4 banks. 
2 
Banks with an index value of 2 follow one of six different “governance paths”. 
Path 1 (see boxes  1 - 2 - 9 - 12 -  MI-index 2 ) 
- The board is classified; 
                                      
16 In some States, for example New York and Texas the statute clarifies that a director's 
term of appointment is the term s/he was appointed for. § 703 New York Business 
Corporation Law provides for example that "each director shall hold office until the 
expiration of the  term for  which  he  is elected". In other jurisdictions, for example Delaware, 
the statute is unclear as to the effects of declassification on the director's term where that 
director was originally appointed for a three year term under a classified board structure. A 
case could be made that declassification alters the directors term (from three years to annual 
election), however, similarly a case could be made that the term is the term for which he/she 
was elected (i.e., for three years). The courts have not addressed this issue although the 
arguments made by the litigants in one case (Roven v Cotter 547 A.2d 603) assume the 
continued application of the three year term (in Delaware the issue is unlikely to be litigated 
given the application of a without cause removal right following declassification). Similar 
problems arise in other States that do not take the New York approach. On balance we think 
in the States that do not take the New York approach the argument for the continued 
applicability of the original (three year) term is the better position, although with respect to 
some States the answer may also depend on the exact wording of the relevant bylaws. The 
issue has similarly not been addressed in other States' case law.  For our purposes this is 
relevant in only one context where: (i) classification is in the by-laws; (ii) following 
declassification the removal right remains a with cause removal right; and (iii) the bank's 
articles or bylaws allow the shareholders to call an interim meeting. If courts in States that 
do not take the New York approach were to provide that declassification reduces a three 
year term to annual election at the annual general meeting then even in banks that, post-
declassification, have a with cause removal right control could be obtained within a year by: 
(i) calling an interim meeting to declassify; and (ii) at the following annual general meeting 
removing the whole board. If, in contrast, the terms are unaffected by declassification then 
it will take approximately two years to obtain control of the board in these circumstances. 
Given this uncertainty in relation to States that do not take the New York approach we 
have elected to take the position that terms are unaffected by declassification in all States 
for the purposes of the Management Insulation Index. Importantly, for the purposes of our 
results taking the opposite view (that declassification results in annual election) does not 
affect the MID score of any bank in our sample. Any future use of the MI-index would 
however want to take this point into account.  
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- nevertheless, shareholders have the right to remove directors without 
cause; 
- shareholders have the right to call a special meeting; 
- there are some director nomination restrictions in place. 
Path 2 (see boxes  1 - 2 - 4 - 5 - 7 - 9 - 12-  MI-index 2 ) 
- The board is classified; 
- shareholders have no right to remove directors without cause; 
- the classification of the board is not contained in the corporate charter, 
but in the by-laws; 
- shareholders can amend the by-laws to declassify the board; 
- The directors can now be removed without cause; 
- shareholders have the right to call a special meeting; 
- there are some director nomination restrictions in place. 
Path 3 (see boxes  1 - 2 - 4 - 5 - 7 - 8 - 9 - 12-  MI-index 2 ) 
- The board is classified; 
- shareholders have no right to remove directors without cause; 
- the classification of the board is not contained in the corporate charter, 
but in the by-laws; 
- shareholders can amend the by-laws to declassify the board; 
- the directors cannot following declassification be removed without cause; 
- shareholders can, however, increase the size of the board to gain control; 
- shareholders have the right to call a special meeting; 
- there are some director nomination restrictions in place. 
Path 4 (see boxes  1 - 2 - 4 - 8 - 9 - 12-  MI-index 2) 
- The board is classified; 
- shareholders have no right to remove directors without cause; 
- the classification of the board is contained in the corporate charter; 
- shareholders can, however, increase the size of the board to gain control; 
- shareholders have the right to call a special meeting; 
- there are some director nomination restrictions in place. 
Path 5 (see boxes  1 - 3 - 9 - 12-  MI-index 2) 
- The board is not classified; 
- shareholders have the right to remove directors without cause; 
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- shareholders have the right to call a special meeting; 
- there are some director nomination restrictions in place. 
Path 6 (see boxes  1 - 3 - 6 - 9 - 12-  MI-index 2) 
- The board is not classified; 
- shareholders have no right to remove directors without cause; 
- shareholders can gain control over the board by increasing the size of the 
board; 
- shareholders have the right to call a special meeting; 
- there are some director nomination restrictions in place. 
Assessment: 
As with MI-index-4 banks, an MI-index value of 2 can be the result of very 
different looking governance arrangements. As we can see in Paths 1-4, even 
where the board is classified it is possible that shareholders can gain control 
over the board almost immediately. In Paths 1 and 2, the combination of 
special meeting rights and the ability to declassify the board or remove 
directors without cause renders the board classification irrelevant for 
entrenchment. Paths 3 and 4 describe a situation where shareholders of a 
corporation with a classified board can gain control via an increase of board 
size. These three sets of governance provisions result in a level of 
entrenchment equivalent to banks with unclassified boards, without cause 
removal rights, and without cause removal rights (Path 5). Even where no 
without cause removal right exists, shareholders can gain control over 
unclassified corporate boards before the next general meeting where they can 
increase board size in a special meeting (Path 6).  
Thus, the connecting characteristic of all MI-index-2 banks is the ability of 
shareholders to obtain control at a special meeting. Director nomination 
restrictions may slightly increase managerial insulation. 
1 
Banks with an index value of 1 are effectively a variation of MI-index-2 
banks. They follow the same six “governance paths”, but there are no 
significant director nomination restrictions in place. 
Assessment: 
Activist shareholders can in principle gain control over the board almost 
immediately, as they are able to call a special meeting (see above). The 
absence of director nomination restrictions arguably slightly reduces the costs 
of gaining control over the board when compared to MI-index-2 banks. 
 
